

Message Text

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EXDIS

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SUBJECT:COUNSELOR NIMETZ' MEETING WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL
ELEKDAG, MAY 30

1. DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR NIMETZ MET AT HIS INVITATION FOR
ONE HOUR EVENING MAY 30 WITH TURKISH MFA SECRETARY-GENERAL
ELEKDAG AND DIRECTOR FOR GREECE-CYPRUS AFFAIRS TULUMEN. MFA
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OFFICER OZGUL WAS ALSO PRESENT. PRINCIPAL TOPICS OF DISCUS-
SION WERE ECEVIT-CARAMANLIS MEETING OF MAY 29; PROPECTS FOR
MOVEMENT ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE; POSSIBILITY OF MEETINGS IN-
VOLVING ECEVIT, CARAMANLIS, KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH; ECEVIT'S
ATTITUDE TOWARDS NATO; AND SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO ARMS
EMBARGO.

2. NIMETZ OPENED THE MEETING BY UNDERSCORING TO ELEKDAG THE ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE TO PUSH STRONGLY FOR REPEAL OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO. THE PRESIDENT WAS PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THIS EFFORT, AND THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE-- AND WE FELT GROWING-- SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS AND IN THE PRESS. WE PRESENTLY STOOD A VERY GOOD CHANCE ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE, BUT THE HOUSE MIGHT PROVE MORE DIFFICULT. ONE OF OUR PROBLEMS WAS THAT MANY CONGRESSMEN SIMPLY KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE ISSUE. NIMETZ STRESSED THAT ECEVIT'S STATEMENTS IN THE U.S. OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT. THE MOST SOLID SUPPORT FOR LIFTING THE EMBARGO

WOULD COME FROM CONGRESSMEN WHO BELIEVED IN A STRONG NATO, AND IF THE IMPRESSION WERE GIVEN THAT TURKEY WAS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN THE ALLIANCE MANY WOULD NO DOUBT QUESTION THE NEED FOR MAKING THE EFFORT. IN THIS CONNECTION, NIMETZ NOTED THAT WE HAD FOUND ECEVIT'S NEW YORK TIMES MAY 30 INTERVIEW SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTING. ELEKDAG REPLIED THAT INTERVIEW AS CARRIED IN TIMES HAD NOT ACCURATELY CAPTURED ECEVIT'S THINKING. THE HEADLINE FOR THE ARTICLE--"TURKISH CHIEF SEES NO RUSSIAN THREAT"--WAS PARTICULARLY MISLEADING.

3. TURNING TO THE CYPRUS ISSUE, NIMETZ SAID THAT THE DENKTASH STATEMENT OF MAY 22 HAD BEEN WELL RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON. IN PARTICULAR, SIGNS OF A MORE FLEXIBLE TURKISH POSTURE ON VAROSHA HAD APPEALED TO A NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN. CONFIDENTIAL

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DENKTASH HAD MADE A GOOD IMPRESSION IN HIS MAY 25 CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS. NIMETZ HANDED TO ELEKDAG, FOR HIS COMMENT, A PAPER ON A POSSIBLE U.N. INTERIM ADMINISTRATION ROLE IN VAROSHA. NIMETZ NOTED THAT WE PLAN TO SUBMIT THE PAPER TO DENKTASH AND POSSIBLY SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE U.N. AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. (TEXT OF PAPER IN PARA 19.) NIMETZ SAID THAT THIS PAPER EMBODIED ESSENTIALLY WHAT DENKTASH HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY DURING THEIR MEETING ON MAY 24. WE HAD INSERTED SPECIFIC DATES AND SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF RETURNEES PRIMARILY ON TACTICAL GROUNDS; THE MORE CONCRETE THE PROPOSAL, THE MORE EFFECTIVE IT WOULD BE. NIMETZ SAID THAT WE WERE NOT VERY SANGUINE THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD ACCEPT A U.N. ROLE IN VAROSHA AS GROUNDS FOR RENEWING THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, BUT WE WANTED TO GIVE FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD PUT FORWARD CONCRETE AND WORKABLE SUGGESTIONS REGARDING VAROSHA. NIMETZ SAID ANY TURKISH SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PAPER WOULD BE WELCOME, BUT STRESSED THAT THIS WAS A KEY PERIOD. ELEKDAG UNDERTOOK TO STUDY THE PAPER. (FOR GOT RESPONSE SEE PARA 20 BELOW.)

4. ELEKDAG SAID HE FELT HE SHOULD CLARIFY FURTHER THE ECEVIT NEW YORK TIMES INTERVIEW. ECEVIT HAD NEVER MADE ANY

STATEMENT ABOUT TURKEY LEAVING NATO. WHAT HE HAD IN FACT SAID WAS THAT, IF THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE WAS NOT FORTHCOMING, TURKEY'S CONTRIBUTION TO NATO WOULD BE COMMENSURATE WITH WHAT TURKEY DERIVED FROM THE ALLIANCE IN BENEFITS. ELEKDAG NOTED THAT A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT WAS PRESENTLY DEVELOPING IN TURKEY WHICH BELIEVED THAT MEMBERSHIP IN NATO BROUGHT MORE RISKS THAN ADVANTAGES. ADHERENTS OF THIS SCHOOL STRESSED THE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE POSITION THAT TURKEY WAS IN AS A CONSEQUENCE OF HER NATO MEMBERSHIP, AND POINTED OUT THAT TURKEY'S OWN MEANS OF DEFENSE HAD BEEN SEVERELY WEAKENED THROUGH U.S. ACTION AND THAT THE ALLIANCE SEEMED TO BE SHOWING NO INTEREST IN HER PLIGHT. ELEKDAG

STRESSED THAT THIS WAS NO MORE THAN AN EMERGING LINE OF
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THINKING IN TURKEY, AND THAT ECEVIT HAD NO INTENTION OF LEAVING NATO NOR OF TRYING TO BLACKMAIL, BLUFF, OR THREATEN.

5. READING FROM HIS NOTES, ELEKDAG PROVIDED A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING OF PRIME MINISTERS ECEVIT AND CARAMANLIS IN BLAIR HOUSE MAY 29. ECEVIT HAD OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT THE GOT HAD BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT THE APRIL MEETING OF THE MFA SECRETARIES-GENERAL HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE AS PLANNED. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE, FURTHER, THAT CARAMANLIS HAD MADE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BEFORE GREEK-TURKISH TENSIONS COULD BE EASED AND THAT REPEAL OF THE EMBARGO SHOULD AWAIT A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. ECEVIT NOTED CARAMANLIS' POSITION THAT THERE COULD BE NO GREEK RE-INTEGRATION INTO THE NATO DEFENSE STRUCTURE WITHOUT A CYPRUS SOLUTION BUT POINTED OUT THE APPARENT CONTRADICTION IN GREECE'S UNWILLINGNESS TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS PROGRESS ON CYPRUS.

6. ECEVIT STRONGLY ENDORSED THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS OF APRIL 13, WHICH HE STRESSED REPRESENTED A NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE PREPARED TO BE FULLY FLEXIBLE ONCE THE TALKS RESUMED. IN CONTRAST TO TURKISH EFFORTS TO STIMULATE PROGRESS, HOWEVER, THE GREEKS WERE DOING NOTHING. ECEVIT URGED CARAMANLIS TO ENCOURAGE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO COME TO THE TABLE, POINTING OUT THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. BOTH COUNTRIES HAD AN OBLIGATION TO PRESS THE TWO CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES TO NEGOTIATE, AND TO HELP THEREBY TO REMOVE THE STUMBLING-BLOCK THAT CYPRUS REPRESENTED IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS.

7. CARAMANLIS EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT BILATERAL PROBLEMS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED SEPARATELY FROM THE CYPRUS ISSUE.
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PURSUIT OF A CYPRUS SOLUTION DID NOT MEAN THAT GREECE AND TURKEY SHOULD NOT CONTINUE TO SUPPORT "THEIR" RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES ON CYPRUS. CARAMANLIS SAID THAT THE DECISION OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TO SEEK REPEAL OF THE ARMS EMBARGO HAD SPOILED THE CLIMATE OF MONTREUX. HE SAID THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD FEEL FREE TO EXPRESS THEIR DIFFERENCES, BUT NOT IN A DISRUPTIVE MANNER. THEY SHOULD CONTINUE THEIR DIALOGUE ON BILATERAL PROBLEMS INDEPENDENT OF THE EMBARGO ISSUE OUTCOME.

8. WITH REFERENCE TO THE GREEK PROPOSAL FOR A NON-AGGRESSION PACT,--ELEKDAG COMMENTED HERE ON THE INCONGRUITY OF SUCH A PACT FOR TWO COUNTRIES WHO WERE ALLIES--ECEVIT SAID THAT THE TURKS WERE READY TO CONCLUDE SUCH A PACT, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS TAKEN UP IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER

BILATERAL MATTERS. IT COULD BE PUT ON THE AGENDA FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL.

9. TURNING ONCE AGAIN TO CYPRUS, ECEVIT NOTED KYPRIANOU'S INSISTENCE ON MEETING WITH HIM AND THE CYPRIOT'S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER DENKTASH AS HIS COUNTERPART. ECEVIT SAID THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO SEE KYPRIANOU IF CARAMANLIS AND DENKTASH WERE PRESENT ALSO. THIS WOULD NOT BE AN OFFICIAL MEETING, BUT KYPRIANOU WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS HIS VIEWS AND TO ASK ALL THE QUESTIONS HE WANTED. ECEVIT ASKED CARAMANLIS TO PASS THIS ON TO KYPRIANOU. HE DID NOT WANT TO DENIGRATE KYPRIANOU AND WAS READY TO TALK TO HIM; BUT IF DENKTASH WERE NOT ALSO PRESENT HE--ECEVIT-- WOULD RUN INTO SERIOUS POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES AND WOULD IN EFFECT BE ACCEPTING KYPRIANOU AS AN INTERLOCUTOR. CITING THE RESIGNATION OF KONUK AND HIS OWN EFFORTS TO INTERVENE AS AN EXAMPLE, ECEVIT STRESSED THAT DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES WERE AT WORK AMONG THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND THAT HE COULD NOT IMPOSE DECISIONS ON THEM. HE COULD PUSH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS, BUT HE COULD NOT TAKE ALL THE RESPONSIBILITY AWAY

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FROM THEM. HE WAS READY FOR AN INFORMAL QUADRIPARTITE MEETING TO DISCUSS THE WHOLE PROBLEM.

10. CARAMANLIS SAID THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS HAD NOT BEEN SUCH AS TO ALLOW HIM TO ENCOURAGE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THEY WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONCRETE AND POSITIVE. ECEVIT COUNTERED THAT

THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE WAS VERY FLEXIBLE ON ALL THREE ISSUES--CONSTITUTION, TERRITORY, AND VAROSHA. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE MAKARIOS-DENKTASH PRINCIPLES, BUT OTHERWISE HAD NO RIGID POSITIONS. ECEVIT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MIGHT HAVE OBJECTIONS TO CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSALS, BUT HE STRESSED THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE WAS READY TO DISCUSS ALL THE ISSUES IN A SPIRIT TO COMPROMISE. CARAMANLIS AGREED TO TALK WITH KYPRIANOU AND TO RECOMMEND MODERATION TO HIM, BUT UNDERSCORED THAT HE DID NOT SEE MUCH CHANCE FOR A QUADRIPARTITE MEETING. THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF A FURTHER SUMMIT WOULD BE ADDRESSED AFTER THE JULY 4-5 ANKARA MEETING OF THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL.

11. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM NIMETZ, ELEKDAG SAID THAT CARAMANLIS HAD NOT GIVEN HIS OWN VIEWS ON A QUADRIPARTITE MEETING BUT HAD MERELY PUT FORWARD KYPRIANOU'S ARGUMENTS. ELEKDAG ADDED THAT ECEVIT HAD VOICED SOME BEWILDERMENT AT KYPRIANOU WANTING TO MEETING WITH HIM AFTER THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE HAD SO THOROUGHLY REJECTED THE APRIL 13 PROPOSALS. WHAT DID HE WANT TO DISCUSS?

12. ELEKDAG RECOUNTED THAT GREEK MFA SEC GEN THEODOROPOULOS HAD APPROACHED HIM EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON OF MAY 30 AND HAD BROUGHT TO HIS ATTENTION THE PARAGRAPH IN THE DRAFT NATO COMMUNIQUE ON LIFTING OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO. CONFIDENTIAL

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THEODOROPOULOS SAID THAT CARAMANLIS WAS POLITICALLY COMMITTED TO MAINTENANCE OF THE EMBARGO, AND COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY CONTRARY LANGUAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE. ELEKDAG HAD RESPONDED THAT THE EMBARGO WAS A PROBLEM BETWEEN THE U.S. AND TURKEY AND AS CARAMANLIS HAD TOLD ECEVIT IT DID NOT CONCERN GREECE.

13. NIMETZ RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF MEETINGS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CYPRUS ISSUE. HE NOTED THAT WALDHEIM HAD BEEN APPROACHED AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRANGING AN INFORMAL ECEVIT-KYPRIANOU MEETING, AND THAT KYPRIANOU HAD INTIMATED HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS IF SUCH A MEETING WERE TO TAKE PLACE. IF IN FACT A MEETING WITH ECEVIT WAS WHAT KYPRIANOU NEEDED IN ORDER TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE IN GREEK CYPRUS, THEN THE TRADE-OFF WAS WELL WORTH CONSIDERING MORE CLOSELY. NIMETZ ADDED THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD NEED TO BE PINNED DOWN IN ADVANCE.

14. ELEKDAG SAID THAT KYPRIANOU'S PURPOSE IN SEEKING A MEETING WITH ECEVIT WAS SIMPLY TO DEVALUE DENKTASH AND TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THAT THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER WAS HIS APPROPRIATE INTERLOCUTOR. THIS WAS POLITICALLY

IMPOSSIBLE FOR TURKEY AND WOULD WRECK DENKTASH. EVEN A TRIPARTITE MEETING--WITHOUT CARAMANLIS--WOULD BE UNATTRACTIVE IN THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD CLAIM THAT DENKTASH WAS NOT IMPORTANT IN HIS OWN RIGHT. INSTEAD, ELEKDAG SUGGESTED THAT WALDHEIM INVITE THE TWO CYPRIOT LEADERS OR THESE TWO PLUS ECEVIT AND CARAMANLIS TO MEET WITH HIM FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS. NIMETZ ASKED WHETHER THIS IDEA HAD BEEN BROACHED WITH WALDHEIM OR URQUHART. ELEKDAG SAID HE HAD NOT TALKED DIRECTLY WITH WALDHEIM BUT THAT TURKISH UN REP TURKMEN HAD PUT FORWARD THIS SUGGESTION AND HAD FOUND THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO BE VERY RELUCTANT.

15. ELEKDAG SAID THAT THE TURKS HAD SOUGHT WITHOUT AVAIL
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TO STIMULATE AN EC-9 STATEMENT IN FAVOR OF A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAD APPROACHED THE GERMANS TO ASK THAT THEY TAKE THE LEAD, AND EVEN THOUGH THE BRITISH WERE SUPPORTIVE THE IDEA HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY THE FRENCH. NIMETZ SAID IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE EUROPEANS DID NOT CONSIDER THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS SUFFICIENTLY FORTHCOMING TO JUSTIFY A MAJOR PUSH ON THEIR PART. WHEN ELEKDAG MENTIONED DENKTASH'S READINESS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT AN AGENDA, NIMETZ POINTED OUT THAT WALDHEIM WAS

VERY CAUTIOUS ON THIS POINT.

16. TULUMEN DREW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD BEEN FOCUSING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE IN RECENT WEEKS, AND HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS COULD IMPLY THAT THEY FOUND THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS ON TERRITORY AND VAROSHA ACCEPTABLE. WHY, HE ASKED, WERE THEY NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN LOGICAL FASHION THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES THAT EXISTED? NIMETZ SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT GREEK CYPRIOT FOCUS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE MEANT THAT THEY WERE READY TO ACCEPT THE OTHER PROPOSALS, AND POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS A SIZEABLE CONCEPTUAL GULF ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE THAT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO BRIDGE. HE WAS NOT SURE WHAT ENDS AN ECEVIT-KYPRIANOU MEETING WOULD SERVE, BUT IT WOULD PERHAPS GIVE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF TURKISH FLEXIBILITY.

17. NIMETZ SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR TO US THAT GREEK CYPRIOT ATTITUDES TOWARDS RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS WERE DETERMINED BY THEIR DESIRE TO PRESERVE THE EMBARGO. WE HAD USED ANY NUMBER OF ARGUMENTS WITH THEM TO PERSUADE THEM THAT NOW WAS THE TIME TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT PROSPECTS WOULD BE
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BLEAKER AFTER THE EMBARGO VOTE. FRANKLY WE WERE NOT VERY HOPEFUL OF PROGRESS AS LONG AS THE EMBARGO AND THEIR OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS WERE THE PRIME CONCERNS FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. ELEKDAG AGREED. FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THE EMBARGO WAS AN "ICON" THAT OBSCURED ALL OTHER ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS, AND THEY WOULD NOT COME TO THE TABLE UNTIL IT WAS REPEALED. NIMETZ ADDED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOT ALONE IN REGARDING THE EMBARGO AS THE SINE QUA NON OF ALL ELSE.

18. NIMETZ URGED AGAIN THAT SOME FURTHER INITIATIVE BE TAKEN ON VAROSHA--SUCH AS ACCEPTANCE OF AN INTERIM U.N. ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE--IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE TURKISH FLEXIBILITY TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND THE CONGRESS. EVEN IF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS RESPONDED NEGATIVELY, THEN THEY WOULD BE SEEN BY MANY IN CONGRESS AS THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY. NIMETZ SAID THAT THE TURKISH SIDE HAD BEEN FORTHCOMING ON ISSUES SUCH AS MISSING PERSONS AND THE REOPENING OF NICOSIA AIRPORT; BUT SOMETHING WAS NEEDED THAT WOULD CAPTURE THE HEADLINES. ELEKDAG DID NOT COMMENT ONEWAY OR OTHER ON THE CONCEPT OF A U.N. ROLE IN VAROSHA, BUT HE MAINTAINED THAT THE TURKISH SIDE HAD BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING IN RESPONDING TO GREEK CYPRIOT CRITICISM OF THE APRIL 13 PROPOSALS AND HAD DONE ALL THAT COULD BE EXPECTED FROM IT. THE IMPORTANT POINT WAS THAT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS WERE NEGOTIABLE. HE

STRESSED THAT NEGOTIATION BY PROXY WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION AND THAT DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES REPRESENTED THE ONLY PATH TO A SOLUTION.

19. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF PAPER HANDED TO ELEKDAG ON POSSIBLE U.N. ROLE IN VAROSHA:

BEGIN TEXT: A PLAN FOR MEANINGFUL PROGRESS TOWARDS A CYPRUS SOLUTION

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AN OPPORTUNITY NOW EXISTS TO MOVE FORWARD TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEMS. VAROSHA IS A KEY ELEMENT IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION. A HELPFUL STEP WOULD BE FOR THE UN TO FACILITATE THE RETURN IN THE COMING MONTHS OF 30-35,000 GREEK CYPRIOTS TO VAROSHA (NEW FAMA-GUSTA).

AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER A DATE HAS BEEN SET FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL CONSULT WITH THE PARTIES AND PREPARE A PLAN FOR THE RETURN OF GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES TO VAROSHA (NEW FAMAGUSTA) UNDER THE FOLLOWING GENERAL GUIDELINES:

A) THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO VAROSHA, AND THE ADMINISTRATION THEREOF, SHALL BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE REGARDING VAROSHA IN A FINAL SETTLEMENT, AND SHALL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES.

B) A UN POLICE FORCE AND A UN ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE THE ADMINISTRATION OF VAROSHA UNTIL ITS FINAL STATUS IS AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES.

C) THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES SHALL PROCEED BY STAGES BEGINNING WITH UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN SURVEYING AND REHABILITATING THE INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROPERTIES. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SHALL COMMENCE RETURNING TO VAROSHA AS SOON AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL DETERMINED IT WAS PRACTICAL FOR THEM TO RETURN, WITH THE FOLLOWING GOALS IN MIND:

-- IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL FINDS IT TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE, AT LEAST 7,500 GREEK CYPRIOTS SHALL BE SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO VAROSHA ON OR BEFORE JULY 30, 1978 AND AN ADDITIONAL
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7,500 ON OR BEFORE SEPTEMBER 15, 1978.

-- THE REMAINING 15-20,000 GREEK CYPRIOTS SHALL BE SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO VAROSHA IN STAGES IN THE SUCCEEDING MONTHS.

D) REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES SHALL BE CALLED UPON BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO LEND SUPPORT TO THIS PROJECT AND TO STUDY OTHER PROJECTS OF A COOPERATIVE NATURE INVOLVING THE TWO COMMUNITIES. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE, BUT NOT NECESSARILY BE LIMITED TO, THE REOPENING OF THE NICOSIA AIRPORT UNDER A UN ADMINISTRATOR, AS WELL AS WATER AND SEWAGE PROJECTS AFFECTING THE TWO COMMUNITIES.

THE NEXT ROUND OF INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS REFERRED TO ABOVE WOULD BUILD UPON THE GUIDELINES EXPRESSED IN THE MAKARIOS-DENKTASH MEETING OF FEBRUARY 1977 AND FURTHER ELABORATED IN THE CONCRETE IDEAS SUBSEQUENTLY PUT FORWARD BY THE PARTIES. EITHER PARTY CAN, OF COURSE, PUT FORTH ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS AT THE MEETING AND BOTH SIDES WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL ALL OF THE IMPORTANT ISSUES YET

TO BE RESOLVED. THE PARTIES WOULD APPROACH SUCH TALKS IN A SPIRIT OF GOODWILL AND FLEXIBILITY AND COMMIT THEMSELVES TO SUSTAINED AND INTENSIVE TALKS DESIGNED TO RESOLVE ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES. END TEXT.

20. ON MAY 31 ELEKDAG TOLD NIMETZ THAT HE HAD REVIEWED THE PAPER AND HIS ONLY COMMENT WAS THAT THE SPECIFIC TARGET DATES SET FORTH IN PARA (C) WERE UNREALISTIC AND IF NOT MET BECAUSE OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS RISKED BEING VIEWED AS A SETBACK OR SIGN OF BAD FAITH. HE SUGGESTED THE DATES BE DELETED. HIS POINT WAS TAKEN AND PAPER HAS SINCE BEEN REVIEWED TO SHOW BLANK DATES INSTEAD OF JULY 30, 1978 AND SEPTEMBER 15, 1978. CHRISTOPHER

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